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I. THE MICROCOSM ISSUE: SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME (SBS)
The primary focus of my Symposium Article is not Shaken Baby
Syndrome (SBS). The Article comments on a wide range of types of expert
testimony; it uses examples relating to DNA typing, microscopic hair
analysis, comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA), bloodstain pattern
analysis (BPA), psychiatry, forensic odontology, and intoxication testing.
However, the Article does touch on SBS. The Article proposes a test
including a second prong that an accused should be entitled to a new trial
when subsequent research seriously undermines a technique or theory that
the prosecution relied on at the prior trial in the sense that the new research
provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the new theory over the prior.
To illustrate the application of that prong of the test, the article draws a
contrast. On one hand, the article argues that a new trial is warranted when
a later mtDNA test excludes an accused even though at the earlier trial the
prosecution introduced a microscopist’s opinion that the accused was the
likely source of the hair strand discovered at the crime scene.1 For its part,
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis, School
of Law.
1
The Symposium Article differentiates between the question of whether the subsequent
research sufficiently invalidates the prior testimony and the issue of whether at a new trial the
presentation of the new research is likely to change the outcome of the case. As Professors
Findley and Risinger put it, the focus of the article is “a single variable in a multi-variable
analysis” required to determine whether to grant a new trial. To gain a new trial, the accused
must show both that to some extent the new research calls into question the validity of the
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the microscopic analysis relies on the witness’s subjective judgment; and in
one of the leading investigations of the reliability of such analysis, half the
declared matches were false positives.2 The 2002 FBI study found that in
11% of the studied case in which the microscopist had declared a match,
mtDNA analysis definitely excluded the suspect.3 Each essential step in
mtDNA analysis has been validated in much the same way as the essential
steps in nuclear DNA testing. Thus, in this situation there is a solid empirical
basis for concluding that the mtNDA result trumps the microscopist’s
opinion.
The Article contrasts that situation with a case in which a
biomechanical expert contradicts a pathologist’s opinion that the cause of an
infant’s fatal brain injuries was SBS. Like a prior 2010 article on SBS4 and
the discussion of SBS in a treatise,5 the article points out that there are
significant weaknesses in the case for SBS. The article notes that
biomechanical research conducted since the advent of the SBS theory
presents a serious challenge to SBS. Nevertheless, the article argues that this
case is distinguishable from the hair analysis situation. As previously stated,
each essential step in mtDNA analysis has been studied and empirically
validated. The same cannot be said for the biomechanical case against SBS.
Some biomechanical experts contend that mere manual shaking of an infant
cannot generate the forces necessary to cause fatal brain injury. However,
rather than relying on empirically validated brain injury thresholds for
infants, biomechanical experts rely on “estimated” thresholds; they have to
do so because medical ethics precludes subjecting actual infants to the
controlled experiments that would be necessary to derive validated
thresholds. The biomechanical experiments in question have involved adult
primates and anthropomorphic models. In short, the empirical validity of
mtDNA analysis has been demonstrated more thoroughly than the
biomechanical critique of SBS.
In their Response, Professors Keith Findley and Michael Risinger take
the position that the article understates the extent to which the critique of
prior testimony and some likelihood that at a new trial the introduction could affect the
outcome. Footnotes 44-47 of the Symposium Article note that the jurisdictions employ
varying standards to define the requisite effect of the introduction of the new research.
2
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 119 (Sept. 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defaul
t/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.
3
Id. at 121.
4
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of the Science
(And Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (Jan.-Feb. 2010) [hereinafter Battle].
5
2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL
MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19.05[a] (5th ed. 2012 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter
GIANNELLI].
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SBS calls the validity of the SBS theory into question. They state that I was
misled by the writings of some of the strongest proponents of SBS, Dean
Joelle Anne Moreno and a former prosecutor, Mr. Brian Holmgren.6 It is
true that both this article and the 2010 piece conclude that SBS testimony is
admissible. (For that matter, Professors Findley and Risinger opine that such
testimony is “likely admissible.”7) The extended treatment of SBS in the
2010 article does not argue that the case for SBS rests on classic scientific
research in the sense of controlled experiments. Rather, the article lays out
a different argument supporting SBS: There are tens of cases in which the
autopsy of deceased infants revealed fatal brain injuries, and the other
evidence indicated that there was shaking without striking. The 2010 article
and the present article acknowledge that this argument is not scientific in the
traditional sense8 but contend that nevertheless, these studies support a
rational inference that shaking can cause fatal brain injuries to
infants.Professors Findley and Risinger dismiss this argument as “a thin reed
indeed” and argue that the Symposium Article ought to conclude that the
critique has so seriously undermined the SBS theory that a new trial should
be awarded.
Professors Findley and Risinger’s Response places me in a curious
position. As previously stated, they claim that in general I am too supportive
of SBS and more specifically that I have been misled by the writings of Dean
Moreno and her coauthor, Mr. Holmgren. Ironically, those claims would
come as a surprise to Dean Joelle Moreno and Brian Holmgren. The
Response cites one of Dean Moreno’s articles.9 Dean Moreno and Mr.
Holmgren have written two substantial pieces on the subject. In those
articles, Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren characterize me as one of the
“small” group of academics who “vocal[ly]” advance the “specious” claim
that the SBS theory may be “junk science.”10 Indeed, Professor Findley and
6
Keith A. Findley & D. Michael Risinger, The Science and Law Underlying PostConviction Challenges to Shaken Baby Syndrome Convictions: A Response to Professor
Imwinkelried, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1209, n.24.
7
Id. at n.45.
8
The 2010 Article explicitly refers to the reliance on case studies as “non-scientific.”
Battle, supra note 4. See also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate
Validation” in Daubert—Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition, not the
Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735 (2003).
9
Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at n.14 (citing Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian
Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There Is No Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome Scientific Controversy, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1357 [hereinafter
The Supreme Court]. See also Joelle Anne Moreno, Extralegal Supreme Court PolicyMaking, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 451, 513–14 (2015).
10
The Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 1373; Joelle Anne Moreno & Brian Holmgren,
Dissent Into Confusion: The Supreme Court, Denialism, and the False “Scientific”
Controversy Over Shaken Baby Syndrome, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 153, 158–59 [hereinafter
Dissent].
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I are mentioned in the same breath—that is, the same footnotes in the two
articles—as leading critics of SBS. The upshot is that both the strong
proponents of SBS and its strong opponents take issue with my position.
However, that is understandable.
A. Support for SBS
It is expectable that Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren think that I am
insufficiently supportive of SBS. The titles of their two articles assert their
belief that there is no legitimate controversy over the validity of SBS; one
refers to “the False ‘Scientific’ Controversy Over Shaken Baby Syndrome”11
while the other flatly asserts that “There Is No Abusive Head Trauma/
Shaken Baby Syndrome ‘Scientific’ Controversy.”12 In contrast, the title of
the 2010 article refers to “A Genuine Battle of the Scientific (and NonScientific) Experts.”13 Moreover, in treatise, I wrote that the courts should
approach SBS testimony with “wariness.”14 Both the 2010 article and this
Symposium Article contend that SBS’ reliance on case reports raises
common sense doubts about the validity of the theory:
[I]t is questionable to accept these [case] reports at face value.
[T]he caregiver could easily be traumatized by the event; and as a
consequence, he or she might experience amnesia or “defensive
forgetting” of any impact. A loving parent’s recollection of their
child’s head accidentally striking an object or wall might be a
painful memory that the parent would want to repress. On the
alternative assumption that the caregiver acted in bad faith, in
order to minimize her culpability the caregiver might deliberately
withhold the detail that they struck the child’s head against an
object or surface.15
I also agree with Professors Findley and Risinger that there is credible
evidence that symptoms such as severe retinal hemorrhages in infants are not
pathognomonic for head trauma; there can be other causes.16 In sum, my
position is that it is inaccurate to claim that it is as settled as Dean Moreno

11

Dissent, supra note 10.
The Supreme Court, supra note 9.
13
Battle, supra note 4.
14
GIANNELLI, supra note 5, at 249, § 19.05[a].
15
Battle, supra note 4, at 174. In fact, both of Dean Moreno’s articles recognize the risk
that an accused who acted in bad faith would withhold relevant details from the authorities.
Supreme Court, supra note 9, at 1424; Dissent, supra note 10, at 216.
16
Mark J. Shuman & Kenneth D. Hutchins, Severe Retinal Hemorrhages with
Reinoschisis in Infants Are Not Pathognomonic for Abusive Head Trauma, 62 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 807 (2017).
12
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and Mr. Holmgren make it out to be that without a striking, merely shaking
an infant can cause fatal brain injury.
B. Opposition to SBS
However, I can also understand why Professors Findley and Risinger
find my position unsatisfactory. They do not cast their position as
categorically as Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren do. In particular,
Professors Findley and Risinger do not assert that it is clearly settled that
SBS is junk science. However, they state their position forcefully. For
example, they claim that the recent research has “indisputably debunk[ed]”
many of the propositions previously advanced by SBS proponents. They
draw on published articles by authors such as Doctors Faris A. Bandak17 and
Patrick Barnes.18 They acknowledge that the recent biomechanical research
has involved primates and models and concede that biomechanical experts
rely on “estimated” brain injury thresholds for infants. However, they
counter that those facts “would only invalidate the findings of the
biomechanical research if those estimates—based on extrapolation from
known injury thresholds for adults, cadaver studies, animal studies, and
computer modeling—were off by many orders of magnitude, which is highly
unlikely.”19
I largely agree with the individual points made by Professors Findley
and Risinger. However, the case for the validity of the critique of SBS is
still weaker than the extent of the validation of mtDNA—the contrast made
in the Symposium Article. It is certainly permissible for an expert to rely on
sensible extrapolation in his or her analysis.20 Furthermore, in this setting
the extrapolations are highly plausible. But the bottom line is that
plausibility does not equate with proof. The plausibility of a hypothesis
makes it a good candidate for an empirical test, but it is not a substitute for
the test. Unfortunately, in this context medical ethics bar any test to directly
determine infant’s brain injury threshold.
The article by Dr. Bandak cited by Professors Findley and Risinger is
frequently invoked by the biomechanical critics of SBS. However, that
article has been criticized. As Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren have noted,
[B]iomechanics experts have published articles critiquing Dr.
Bandak’s conclusions. In 2006, Dr. Susan Margulies of the
University of Pennsylvania Department of Engineering, along
with seven other biomechanical engineers, discovered that Dr.
17
18
19
20

Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1216 n.27.
Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1212, 1217 nn.10 & 30.
Findley & Risinger, supra note 6, at 1216 n.26.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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Bandak had made significant errors in his mathematical
calculations which led her to express “grave[] concern[s] that the
conclusion reached by Bandak may be invalid due to apparent
numerical errors in his estimation of forces.” When Dr. Margulies
repeated Dr. Bandak’s calculations, not only was she unable to
replicate his findings, but she found “values of neck forces that
are actually more than 10 times lower than those [calculated by
Dr. Bandak].” Dr. Margulies found that Dr. Bandak had used
“flawed calculations” to “erroneously conclude[] that the neck
forces in even the least severe shaking event far exceed the
published injury tolerances of the infant neck.” According to Dr.
Margulies, “when accurately calculated, the range of neck forces
is considerably lower, and includes values that are far below the
threshold of injury” calculated by Bandak.21
Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgrem add that two of the coauthors of Dr.
Margulies’ article were authorities whom Dr. Bandak cited in his paper.22 In
short, opposition to SBS among biomechanical engineers is not monolithic.
For that matter, in an article written last year, Dr. Barnes, another
authority cited by Professors Findley and Risinger, made it clear that he is
“not one who says shaking can’t cause the triad” at the heart of SBS—
subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and brain injury.23 To be sure, he
disagrees with experts who previously “march[ed] in lockstep”24 and
testified in absolutist terms that shaking not only could cause fatal brain
injury but went to the length of declaring that the triad of symptoms was
“pathognomonic of SBS.”25 However, he uses the adjective “unsettled” to
describe the state of the research about the “SBS versus impact trauma”
question.26
I confess that I am probably uncommonly concerned about the
uncertainty in expert analysis. Shortly after the rendition of the Daubert
decision, I wrote a piece about the implications of the decision.27 The article
recognizes the importance of the Court’s formal holdings that the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence impliedly superseded the Frye general
21

Supreme Court, supra 9, at 1385–86.
Supreme Court, supra 9, at 1386.
23
Patrick Barnes, Child Abuse—Nonaccidental Injury (NAI) and Abuse Head Trauma
(AHT)—Medical Imaging: Issues and Controversies in the Era of Evidence-Based Medicine,
50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 679, 687 (2017).
24
Id. at 685.
25
Id. at 679.
26
Id. at 686.
27
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching
Implications of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific
Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55 (1995).
22
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acceptance test and that the reference to “scientific knowledge” in Rule 702
prescribes a new reliability/validation test. However, I wrote then—and still
believe—that the most important passage in Daubert is the Court’s explicit
acknowledgment of the uncertainty in scientific analysis: “arguably, there
are no certainties in science.”28 No matter how many experimental tests
appear to confirm a hypothesis, one can always conceive of another test; and
so long as that is true, there is a possibility of subsequent falsification of the
hypothesis. More recently, I have written about the uncertainty of seemingly
precise scientific measurements—such as the measurements that
biomechanical experts make. 29 Metrology is the science of measurement.
The fundamental tenet of metrology is that one can never be certain that he
or she has captured the true value of the measurand.30 No matter how
scrupulously the analyst conducts the measurement and no matter how
carefully the measuring instrument has been calibrated, there is always
uncertainty in the most exacting scientific measurement.
It is especially appropriate to acknowledge the considerable uncertainty
surrounding SBS. In the United Kingdom, the Royal Society and the Royal
Society of Edinburgh have teamed to prepare a series of primers on scientific
issues for the judges in their countries. They have already issued primers on
DNA typing and another on so-called gait analysis, the theory that a
computer can identify a walker depicted in a video by studying the nuances
of their movements. The primer on gait analysis informs the judges that
“there is a lack of credible research” to validate the theory.31 However,
despite a request by judges for a primer on SBS, to date the societies have
not issued a primer on that topic. A board commissions the primers. His
Honor Mark Wall, QC, is the representative of criminal judges on the board.
Judge Wall explained the societies’ failure to release a primer on SBS: The
gist of his explanation is that “there is as yet no consensus. The science was
and still is far from settled.” That assessment is accurate. That assessment
confirms that the criticisms of SBS, including the biomechanical research,
have not undermined SBS as seriously as mtDNA analysis has undercut
microscopic hair analysis.

28

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
Ted Vosk & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Measurements in Forensic
Science—of Errors and Uncertainty, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 532 (2017); Edward Imwinkelried,
The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing Miscarriages of Justice: Intellectual
Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J.
333 (2014).
30
See generally TED VOSK & ASHLEY F. EMERY, FORENSIC METROLOGY: SCIENTIFIC
MEASUREMENT AND INFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND CRIMINALISTS (2015).
31
Pallab Ghosh, UK Judges to Get Scientific Guides, BBC (Nov. 27, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-42057009.
29
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C. The Macrocosm Issue: The Standard for Granting New Trials
The Symposium Article proposes a two-pronged standard for
determining whether the subsequent analysis has invalidated the prior theory
to the extent that a new trial is warranted.32 As previously stated, the second
prong is that the new analysis seriously undermines the prior theory in the
sense that it provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the new theory
over the prior theory. As an illustrative case, the article poses a hypothetical
case in which an mtDNA analysis excludes a person whom a microscopist
testifies might well be the source of a hair strand. The other, initial prong of
the proposed test is that the new analysis utterly discredits the prior theory.
The Article uses CBLA to illustrate that prong.33 At one time FBI experts
testified that based on a comparative elemental analysis of a crime scene
bullet and a bullet associated with the accused, they could determine whether
the two bullets came from the same batch, that is, a single day’s production
at a bullet manufacturing plant. An essential assumption of CBLA analysis
was that the elemental composition of each batch is both uniform and unique.
However, after FBI experts had repeatedly testified on the basis of CBLA,
William Tobin began to question that assumption. When he reviewed the
production data from bullet manufacturers, he discovered that the
assumption was false: There were often variations within each batch, and
sometimes the elemental composition of different batches matched.34 This
situation is a step beyond the mtDNA case. In that case, the mtDNA analysis
does not directly contradict an essential assumption of microscopic hair
analysis; rather, the mtDNA analysis yields an inconsistent result, and the
mtDNA analysis trumps because the thoroughgoing validation of mtDNA
provides a solid empirical basis for preferring the mtDNA result. Tobin’s
analysis directly invalidated an essential assumption of CBLA.
The original article proposes the two-pronged test as the standard
because both prongs are judicially manageable and consistent with a
commitment to empiricism. The question posed by the Response is whether
we should go farther. The Response argues in favor of doing so by endorsing
the standard adopted by the intermediate Wisconsin appellate court in State
v. Edmonds.35 There the court announced that “the emergence of a legitimate
32
Again, to use Professors Findley and Risinger’s terminology, that is the proposal for
one “variable in a multi-variable analysis” to determine whether to award a new trial. Another
variable is the effect that the introduction of the new evidence would likely have had to the
prior verdict. See supra note 1.
33
In most cases, firearms experts rely on a comparative analysis of the striations on the
two bullets. However, in some cases the crime scene bullet is too deformed to permit that
type of analysis.
34
William A. Tobin & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43 (2003).
35
746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
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and significant dispute within the medical community” over SBS constitutes
newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial.36 A number of cases
embrace a similar standard.37 Professors Findley and Risinger state that the
Symposium Article does not ascribe sufficient “significance” to the “shifts
in the scientific and medical understandings underlying the SBS/AHT
hypothesis.”
In fact, such shifts can have a four-fold significance. First, at the
original trial they can provide the defense with a powerful argument for
summation. The thrust of the argument would be that there is reasonable
doubt because, using a different theory, another qualified expert came to a
different conclusion than the prosecution expert.38 The defense attorney
might argue:
Ladies and gentlemen, her Honor will instruct you that you cannot
find Mr. Welsh guilty unless you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that he shook his child and that that shaking
caused his child’s brain injuries. There’s obviously reasonable
doubt in this case. You heard two experts with impressive
credentials give diametrically opposed opinions about causation.
One says Yes. The other says No. Our witness, Dr. Vanucci,
explained that while at one time many experts agreed with the
shaken baby theory, today many experts, including her, reject it.
Even the scientists can’t agree. Ladies and gentlemen, none of us
is a scientist. I know I’m not. During jury selection, you all to me
that you don’t have a scientific background. If the scientists can’t
agree among themselves, how in the world can lay people—
regular folks like us—decide the scientific issue and conclude that
there was causation?
If even a single juror found that argument convincing, the argument could
prevent the return of a guilty verdict.
Second, especially in a Frye jurisdiction, the shift would presumably
raise grave doubts in a court’s mind about the reliability of any verdict based
on SBS. The most popular rationale for the Frye test is that lay jurors lack
the background and critical acumen to resolve a true battle of the experts.39
Positing that rationale, the courts reasoned that proof of general acceptance
36

Id. at 599.
E.g., People v. Bailey, 999 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Term 2014) (noting a sea change in
medical thinking).
38
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 134 (5th ed. 2014).
39
See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244–45 (Cal. 1976); People v. Barney, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977); Grady
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003).
37
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would be the best proxy or surrogate for a direct inquiry into the scientific
merit of the technique or theory.40 If that is the case and subsequent research
generally erodes the scientific community’s faith in the validity of a theory
that a prior conviction rests on, the court ought to be concerned that the prior
conviction represented a miscarriage of justice. At one time, Frye was the
overwhelming majority view in the United States.41
Thirdly and most importantly, in a Frye jurisdiction a marked shift in
sentiment in the relevant scientific communities can have a critical impact
on the admissibility analysis. If the admissibility test is general acceptance
and the shift has reduced the support for the theory below the general
acceptance level, the prosecution testimony about the theory will not even
be admissible at a retrial.
Fourth and finally, if that prosecution testimony is necessary evidence
on an essential element of the charged crime—such as causation in a
prosecution for an infant’s murder—the prosecution will not even have
enough evidence to survive a motion for a directed verdict. The exclusion
of the evidence under Frye will render the prosecution case legally
insufficient to sustain the government’s initial burden of production or going
forward.
Given the third and fourth dimensions of the significance of the shift, it
becomes clear that the Edmonds test is the Frye-era equivalent of the first
prong of the test proposed by the Symposium Article for the Daubert era.
Most jurisdictions have moved away from Frye toward some version of a
Daubert-style reliability test.42 Under Frye, proof of a significant shift in
sentiment directly negates an essential foundational requirement for the
admissibility of the testimony, namely, proof of general acceptance. In the
Daubert era, as in the CBLA example, proof of subsequent research utterly
discrediting an essential assumption of the prior theory directly negates an
empirical requirement for a satisfactory foundation.
It made eminently good sense in the Frye era to treat a showing of a
significant shift in expert sentiment—standing alone—as an adequate basis
for granting a new trial. It is less clear that that standard is well suited for
the Daubert era. After the panel at Professor Risinger’s Symposium, there
was a question-and-answer period. One of the attendees asked why the
Symposium Article criticized the new California legislation on shifted
science. The amended California statute, Penal Code § 1473, authorizes new
trial relief whenever the prosecution witness at the prior trial later
40

Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 722–35
(1994).
41
GIANNELLI, supra note 5, § 1.06.
42
GIANNELLI, supra note 5, §§ 1.08-1.10.
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“repudiate[s]” his or her opinion. The Symposium Article remarks:
It is . . . wrong-minded to treat an expert’s repudiation of prior
testimony as an adequate basis for postconviction relief. No
expert schooled in the empirical tradition would accept a
scientist’s change of mind without inquiring why the scientist has
adopted a new view. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated that
reliable “knowledge” “connotes more than subjective relief . . . .”
At the original trial [if Daubert governed], the judge should never
have admitted the expert’s opinion if it amounted to nothing more
than the expert’s subjective opinion. By the same token, at the
later postconviction relief proceeding, the judge should not accept
the expert’s repudiation of the earlier opinion [as an adequate
justification for granting a new trial] if the repudation amounts to
nothing more than a subjective change of mind.
The courts arguably should treat evidence of a change in the scientific
community’s collective sentiment in the same fashion. Under Daubert, the
extent of the acceptance is only one of the factors that the judge considers in
evaluating the sufficiency of the showing of the reliability of a technique or
theory.43 If the judge takes the empirical tradition seriously, standing alone
proof of the popularity of a technique or theory should not guarantee the
admissibility of testimony based on the technique or theory. The judge ought
to inquire why the technique or theory enjoys that popularity: Is there
empirical data warranting that level of popularity? The parallel reasoning
would be that without more, a change in the expert community’s collective
sentiment does not mandate a new trial. Here too the judge should ask why
the sentiment has shifted. Can the defense point to new scientific research
or further accumulated experience that accounts for the shift and answers the
why question. Adding an empirical component to the inquiry provides
greater assurance that on the specific facts of the case, the policy of
overturning potentially wrongful convictions outweighs the legitimate public
interest upholding finality of judgment. Under Daubert, the expert’s ipse
dixit does not suffice.44 Neither should the ipse dixit of the scientific
community. Its collective sentiment was dispositive under Frye, but that is
no longer true in federal practice and most states.
In their Response, Professors Findley and Risinger are not content to
prove that there has been a shift in the sentiment in the scientific community
regarding SBS. If a shift in sentiment automatically warranted a new trial,
they could have radically shortened the Response by citing only the survey
43
44

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
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described in footnote 23: “two surveys of pathologists found that 35% to
nearly 60% of forensic pathologists in 2010 and 2015 respectively question
the SBS ‘diagnosis.’’ Instead, they marshaled a wealth of empirical studies
that yielded findings inconsistent with the SBS theory. Whether by design
or accident, they strove to establish both the occurrence of the shift in
medical sentiment and the empirical data prompting the shift. In effect, they
addressed the why question.
CONCLUSION
In their Response, Professors Findley and Risinger criticize the
Symposium Article for failing to sufficiently explore the significance of
shifts in scientific sentiment. That criticism is justified. The Response has
prompted me to consider that issue further. As we have seen, a shift can be
significant in four different respects. It can not only affect the weight of the
prosecution testimony. In addition, particularly in Frye jurisdictions, a
marked shift can impact the court’s view of the reliability, admissibility, and
legal sufficiency of the prosecution testimony. As previously stated, the
Edmonds standard was ideally suited for the Frye era; a significant shift
could directly negate general acceptance and render the prosecution
testimony inadmissible as well as legally insufficient. The question that now
presents itself is whether we should update the standard for an era in which
most jurisdictions adhere to some variation of the Daubert standard.
In closing, I would like to thank Professors Findley and Risinger—as
well as Dean Moreno and Mr. Holmgren. In his concurrence in Daubert,
Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced the concern that the new validation standard
would push federal judges out of their comfort zone and force them to
become amateur scientists.45 More broadly, Daubert posed a challenge to
judges, attorneys, and Evidence scholars: Would they be willing to stop
“hiding from science,” roll up their sleeves, and deeply immerse themselves
in the empirical data and methodologies that they needed to understand to
make Daubert “work”? Professor Findley, Professor Risinger, Dean
Moreno, and Mr. Holmgren have done precisely that. It is true that they have
not resolved the controversy over SBS. However, thanks to their efforts, we
have a much more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the various
aspects of the controversy.46 Their example gives us reason to be hopeful
45

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598–99 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
The Symposium Article deals with only the admissibility of testimony about SBS and
post-conviction claims that a new trial should be granted because the trial judge erred in
admitting the testimony. The Article does not discuss the question of whether, standing alone,
SBS testimony is legally sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. See RANDY PAPETTI,
THE FORENSIC UNRELIABILITY OF THE SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME 195, 257, 308–09
(2018); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Legal Sufficiency Analysis of Genuine Battles of the
Experts in Criminal Trials: The Unrealized Potential of the Supreme Court’s Landmark
46
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about the Daubert era.

Decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 54 CRIM. L. BULL. (forthcoming 2018).
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